University of Connecticut

OpenCommons@UConn
Connecticut Law Review
2021

Of Omnipotent Things
Joel I. Colon-Rios

Follow this and additional works at: https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Colon-Rios, Joel I., "Of Omnipotent Things" (2021). Connecticut Law Review. 480.
https://opencommons.uconn.edu/law_review/480

School of Law

CONNECTICUT

LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 52

APRIL 2021

NUMBER 5

Essay
Of Omnipotent Things
JOEL I. COLÓN-RÍOS
To say that some constituent assemblies have acted as omnipotent lawmakers, as not subject to the separation of powers, and as able to exercise the
ordinary powers of government, is an understatement. It is, in fact, the way in
which many, if not most, constitution-making bodies have operated since the late
18th century. A famous historical example is the French National Convention of
1793, which despite having been called under an already constituted legal order
and after having drafted a (later popularly ratified) constitution, declared a state
of emergency, abolished the separation of powers, and proceeded to govern the
country. In early U.S. constitutional history, some state constitutional conventions
also assumed an unlimited law-making jurisdiction, and contemporary concerns
about runaway conventions seem to be largely based on that possibility. Much
more recently, in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, such type of power has
been exercised by constituent assemblies in Latin America. All these entities went,
in some way, beyond the adoption of novel constitutions and played legislative,
executive, and sometimes even judicial functions. As a result, I will argue in this
paper, they should not be understood as having engaged in the exercise of
constituent authority, but of sovereignty plain and simple.
The distinction between constituent authority and sovereignty is not merely
terminological; it points toward things that an entity tasked to exercise constituent
authority cannot do. In addition to drafting a document that counts as a
‘constitution’ in the society at issue, constituent authority, the paper argues, would
normally be subject to at least one implicit limit: it must not engage in ordinary
governmental activity. An entity called to exercise constituent authority could,
moreover, be subject to explicit limits as to the type of constitutional content it
must or must not adopt. The traditional definition of sovereignty points precisely
in the opposite direction: a sovereign is an individual or entity not subject to the
separation of powers, capable of transforming any will into law. Part I of the
paper develops the distinction between constituent authority and sovereignty
through a critical analysis of Carl Schmitt’s conception of dictatorship. Part II
examines the way in which different constitution-making bodies, in Latin America
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and the United States, have been conceived by theorists, politicians, and judges.
These entities have been frequently understood as sovereign even though they
were only commissioned to create a constitution. In Part III, I consider the ways in
which the limits on constitution-making bodies that arise from the argument
presented in this paper may be put into practice.
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Of Omnipotent Things
JOEL I. COLÓN-RÍOS *
INTRODUCTION
To say that some constituent assemblies have acted as omnipotent
lawmakers, as not subject to the separation of powers and as able to
exercise the ordinary powers of government, is an understatement. It is, in
fact, the way in which many, if not most, constitution-making bodies have
operated since the late eighteenth century. A famous historical example is
the French National Convention of 1793, which, despite having been called
under an already constituted legal order and after having drafted a (later
popularly ratified) constitution, declared a state of emergency, abolished
the separation of powers, and proceeded to govern the country.1 In early
U.S. constitutional history, some state constitutional conventions also
assumed an unlimited law-making jurisdiction, and contemporary concerns
about runaway conventions seem to be largely based on that possibility.2
Much more recently, in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries,
such type of power has been exercised by constituent assemblies in Latin
America. All these entities went, in some way, beyond the adoption of
novel constitutions and played legislative, executive, and sometimes even
judicial functions. As a result, I will argue in this Article, they should not
be understood as having engaged in the exercise of constituent authority,
but of sovereignty plain and simple.
The distinction between constituent authority and sovereignty is not
merely terminological; it points toward things that an entity tasked to
exercise constituent authority cannot do. In addition to drafting a document
that counts as a “constitution” in the society at issue, constituent authority,
I will argue below, would normally be subject to at least one implicit limit:
it must not engage in ordinary governmental activity. It could, moreover,
be subject to explicit limits as to the type of constitutional content it must
or must not adopt. The traditional view of sovereignty points precisely in
the opposite direction: a sovereign is an individual or entity not subject to
*

Professor of Law, Victoria University of Wellington.
See A. AULARD, THE FRENCH REVOLUTION: A POLITICAL HISTORY 1789–1804, at 11, 217, 220–
21 (Bernard Miall trans., Charles Scribner’s Sons 1910) (describing “decrees that France shall be
declared to be in danger,” the abolition of the separation of powers, and the governing power of the
Convention).
2
For examples of runaway conventions, see Gerald Gunther, The Convention Method of
Amending the United States Constitution, 14 GA. L. REV. 1, 2, 5–10 (1979).
1
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the separation of powers, capable of transforming any will into law.3 Part I
of the paper develops the distinction between constituent authority and
sovereignty through a critical analysis of Carl Schmitt’s conception of
dictatorship. Part II examines the way in which different
constitution-making bodies, in Latin America and the United States, have
been conceived by theorists, politicians, and judges. These entities have
been frequently understood as sovereign even though they were only
commissioned to create a constitution. In Part III, I consider the ways in
which the limits on constitution-making bodies that arise from the
argument presented in this Article may be put into practice.
I. BETWEEN SOVEREIGNTY AND CONSTITUENT AUTHORITY
Richard Kay has distinguished between the concept of constituent
power and that of constituent authority.4 The former can be described as
the unlimitable, unpredictable, and unorganized (and unorganizable) force
that creates a constitution.5 The latter, in contrast, refers “to the observed
quality in a person or persons that enables them to produce an effective
positive law constitution.”6 More than a brute force to impose a
fundamental law on a group of human beings, constituent authority is what
allows an individual or entity to “produce a constitution that is regarded as
binding for an extended period in the population governed by the legal
system that the constitution purports to control.”7 Nevertheless,
recognizing a constituent authority, writes Kay, “necessarily presupposes
something superior to all positive law that cannot logically be provided for
by law.”8 Constituent authority, like constituent power, is in that sense
outside of the scope of legal regulation. In what follows, I will argue that
an entity whose constituent authority is recognized by society can, at the
same time, be subject to different kinds of substantive limits. In the context
of a democratic society, it may be that the observation of those limits is
what determines, at a given moment, “the rightness of the constituent
events”9 or the legitimacy of the constitution maker.10
This does not mean that the exercise of constituent authority is bound
by established legal forms, but that a condition of having “constituent
authority” may be the realization that one is acting on a commission from
3
See JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY 3 (Julian H. Franklin ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press
2004) (1576) (describing sovereignty as absolute and undivided).
4
Richard S. Kay, Constituent Authority, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 715, 717–22 (2011) (emphasis
added).
5
Id. at 719.
6
Id. at 720.
7
Id.
8
Id. at 727.
9
Id. at 721.
10
Id. at 756–57.
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the “true sovereign” and therefore bound to observe the limits attached to
it. This approach is consistent with Kay’s distinction between constituent
power and constituent authority, but not with the idea that constituent
authority cannot be subject to legally enforceable limits. Some of these
limits may be implicit (e.g., the creation of something that counts as a
constitution in the society at issue) and others explicit (e.g., the creation of
specific constitutional content). In some cases, these limits should be
enforced by judges. In order to develop this argument, I will first
distinguish between constituent authority and sovereignty, and I will do so
mainly through an examination of Schmitt’s major work, Dictatorship.11
There Schmitt developed the now well-known distinction between the
commissarial and the sovereign dictator. During a period of commissarial
dictatorship, the constitution remains valid “because [its] suspension only
represents a concrete exception,” that is to say, a situation different to the
normal condition that the constitution presupposes and that the dictator is
tasked to bring back.12 A commissarial dictatorship is thus best exemplified
by an executive who, according to a constitutional provision, is authorised
to issue decrees—during a period of emergency—which are valid even
though contrary to one or more articles of the constitution.13
In the approach presented in Dictatorship, that type of provision would
make possible the exercise of extraordinary (dictatorial) powers by the
executive, but would not give her the power of constitutional change.14 His
sovereign dictator, in contrast, is authorised to amend or replace the
constitution at will. A sovereign dictator:
does not suspend an existing constitution through a law based
on the constitution—a constitutional law; rather it seeks to
create conditions in which a constitution—a constitution that
it regards as the true one—is made possible. Therefore
dictatorship does not appeal to an existing constitution, but to
one that is still to come.15
Sovereign dictatorship could thus be exemplified by a monarch who has
been authorised to replace the entire constitutional order, as well as by a
democratically elected constituent assembly.16 One of the main examples
11

CARL SCHMITT, DICTATORSHIP: FROM THE ORIGIN OF THE MODERN CONCEPT OF
SOVEREIGNTY TO PROLETARIAN CLASS STRUGGLE (Michael Hoelzl & Graham Ward trans., Polity
Press 2014) (2006).
12
Id. at 118.
13
For some examples, see John Ferejohn & Pasquale Pasquino, The Law of the Exception: A
Typology of Emergency Powers, 2 INT’L J. CONST. L. 210 (2004) (discussing American and British
emergency power mechanisms and their basis in Roman law).
14
SCHMITT, DICTATORSHIP, supra note 11, at 118–19.
15
Id. at 119.
16
It was also present in the notion of “the dictatorship of a proletariat identified with the people at
large, in transition to an economic situation in which the state is ‘withering away.’” Id. at 179.
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of a sovereign dictator provided by Schmitt was the previously mentioned
French National Convention of 1793, which he described as “a sovereign
dictatorship of revolution,” and as the “extraordinary organ of a pouvoir
constituant.”17 In Constitutional Theory, Schmitt noted that the reason why
a constitution-making body convened after a revolution is a sovereign
dictator is that it “has no jurisdiction, no competence in the actual sense,
that is, in the sense of a sphere of office regulated and delimited in
advance.”18
Put in a different way, a sovereign dictator is not subject to the
separation of powers: “it can intervene arbitrarily—through legislation,
through the administration of justice, or simply through concrete acts.”19
Schmitt nevertheless maintained that, in the end, all forms of dictatorship,
even the sovereign ones, are based on a commission.20 Regardless of the
legality of its mode of convocation, a constitution-making entity “is not . . .
the sovereign, but instead acts always in the name of and under
commission from the people, which can at any time decommission its
agents through a political act.”21 From this perspective, being a sovereign
dictator and a sovereign is not the same thing: the former acts on a
mandate to bring into existence a new constitutional order; the latter “does
not depend on the accomplishment of a specific task . . . .”22 For example,
by going beyond its task (i.e., by remaining assembled after adopting a
constitution), the French Constitutional Convention of 1793 ceased to be a
sovereign dictator and entered into the terrain of pure sovereignty.23 In this
sense, a sovereign is an entity that, like an absolute prince or a sovereign
people, can arbitrarily exercise constituent and constituted powers in the
absence of any commission.
Schmitt nevertheless maintained that, even if acting on a commission
from the people, a constitution-making body would in practice enjoy an
unlimited jurisdiction given that it would always lack a clear “reference
point for [its] dependence.”24 That is to say, the will of the people is always
“unclear” and has to be “shaped.”25 Given the unclear character of the
people’s will, “[a]s long as such an assembly has not accomplished its
17

Id. at 96, 127.
CARL SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 110 (Jeffrey Seitzer ed. & trans., 2008).
19
SCHMITT, DICTATORSHIP, supra note 11, at 123. This is in fact the “standard definition” of
dictatorship: “a suspension of the separation of powers.” Id. at 129. This standard definition, however,
failed to properly distinguish dictatorship from other types of arrangements in which the separation of
powers is also absent, such as absolute monarchy. Id. at 116.
20
Id. at 119.
21
SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 18, at 110 (emphasis added).
22
SCHMITT, DICTATORSHIP, supra note 11, at 119.
23
Id. at 127–28.
24
Id. at 121.
25
Id. at 124.
18
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work —the constitution—it possesses any imaginable authority.” By
proceeding in this way, Schmitt did not fully develop the more promising
features of his distinction between sovereignty and sovereign dictatorship.
That is to say, if a constituent assembly, even if convened in violation of a
constitution’s amendment rule, acts on a commission from the true
sovereign, then it must draft a constitution and be bound by any other
conditions arising from its mandate.27 Those conditions would normally be
expressed in the process through which the assembly was convened. Of
course, in some cases, they would not have been (or could not have been)
explicitly stated, as may be the case of a constituent assembly called after a
civil war or a revolution.28 But even in exceptional situations, to describe
the assembly as “sovereign” as the sovereign people itself would be
inaccurate. 29
Under this approach, a constitution making body exercises, on behalf
of the people, a special jurisdiction to issue constitutional norms. When
that activity takes place under an already existing constitutional order, the
constitution-maker acts on the basis of a commission from the very
sovereign from which the established constitution is supposed to have
emanated.30 Since the constitution-making body is not the sovereign origin
of the separation of powers but its creature, it can separate powers in novel
ways but cannot exercise them. It exists because these powers have already
been divided and, therefore, it is possible to speak about a special
constitution-making jurisdiction separate from the ordinary institutions of
the state. If the exercise of constituent power violates the already
established separation (by acting in an executive, ordinary legislative, or
judicial capacity), it would be acting ultra vires the real sovereign; that is,
ultra vires the commission that authorised its exercise in the first place.31
26

Id. at 203.
Id. at 125.
28
Id. at 126.
29
See SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 18, at 110 (explaining that the assembly is
sovereign, but not the sovereign because it always acts “under commission of the people”).
30
Id.
31
The previous interpretation of Schmitt may appear to contradict his most famous essay on
sovereignty, contained in the first chapter of Political Theology. See CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL
THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 6–7 (George Schwab trans., Mass.
Inst. of Tech. 1985) (1988) (describing a situation in which someone becomes the de facto sovereign
during an emergency by protecting the established constitutional order). The French National
Convention, as mentioned earlier, was a sovereign dictator that became a sovereign (or simply, a
dictator) when it went beyond its commission and decided that the threat of counter-revolution required
it to assume all powers of government. SCHMITT, DICTATORSHIP, supra note 11, at 127–28. This is why
Schmitt wrote that the sovereign dictator “is sovereign in a completely different sense from that in
which the absolute monarch or a sovereign aristocracy can be said to be ‘sovereign.’” Id. at 127. This is
in fact consistent with Juan Donoso Cortés’s conception of dictatorship, to which Schmitt frequently
referred. See Juan Donoso Cortés, Speech on Dictatorship (Jan. 4, 1849), in SELECTED WORKS OF JUAN
DONOSO CORTÉS, 45, 47 (Jeffrey P. Johnson ed. & trans., 2000) (expounding on “theoretical truth” and
27
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Schmitt nevertheless did not reach that conclusion and, as noted earlier,
claimed that during the time the assembly has not adopted a constitution, it
could exercise any “imaginable authority.”32
II. SOVEREIGN ASSEMBLIES
Perhaps the most famous contemporary examples of assemblies which,
having been commissioned with the creation of a constitution, engaged in
the exercise of what I previously described as sovereignty, are that of
Colombia (1991) and Venezuela (1999).33 Both assemblies dissolved the
ordinary legislatures and replaced them with temporary legislative bodies
(largely comprised by deputies appointed from the constituent assemblies’
membership). They also intervened, again in different degrees (and more
intrusively in Venezuela than in Colombia), with the power of the ordinary
courts.34 The justification for the exercise of that seemingly unlimited
jurisdiction was, in both cases, the idea that these assemblies had been
authorized to draft a constitution. It was a justification that was reflected
both in the rules that governed their convocation, as well as by the judicial
decisions that recognised in them an unlimited jurisdiction.35 Perhaps a
more dramatic example is provided by the Venezuelan Constituent
Assembly of 2017, which is operating at the moment. This entity was
controversially convened by the President of the Republic himself (that is,
with no authorising referendum)36 in a context of political violence and
“historical fact” of dictatorship across differing socio-political structures); SCHMITT, POLITICAL
THEOLOGY, supra, at 56–60 (describing Donoso Cortés’s criticism of liberalism); SCHMITT,
DICTATORSHIP, supra note 11, at 276 n.11, 278–79 n.22 (citing Donoso Cortés’s concept of
dictatorship in support of Schmitt’s theory). But see Brian Fox, Schmitt’s Use and Abuse of Donoso
Cortés on Dictatorship, 23 INTELL. HIST. REV. 159, 161 (2013) (criticizing Schmitt for “project[ing]
backward[]” on Donoso Cortés his own views on dictatorship to construct a link between anti-liberal
Catholic thought and fascism).
32
SCHMITT, DICTATORSHIP, supra note 11, at 203.
33
There are, of course, examples of sovereign entities in clear authoritarian contexts. This was the
case of the military juntas that governed Spain and Chile during an important part of the 20th century.
34
For an in-depth discussion of these assemblies and the role they played during the
constitution-making processes, see Nicolás Figueroa García-Herreros, A Critique of Populist
Jurisprudence: Courts, Democracy, and Constitutional Change in Colombia and Venezuela (May 2016)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The New School for Social Research) (on file with the Connecticut
Law Review).
35
See, e.g., Judgment no. 17 of the Supreme Court of Justice of Venezuela on the Referendum for
Convening a Constituent Assembly (Jan. 19, 1999); “Bases Comiciales para el referéndum consultivo
sobre la convocatoria de la Asamblea Nacional Constituyente a celebrarse el 25 de abril de 1999”,
Resolution No. 990323-71 (Mar. 23, 1999); Judgment no. 138 (Nov. 9, 1990) in Gaceta Especial Sala
Constitucional, Corte Suprema de Justicia, República de Colombia (Santafé de Bogotá, D.C., 1993).
36
This mode of convocation was highly controversial and was eventually challenged in the
Supreme Tribunal of Justice, where it was sanctioned. Judgment 2017-0519, Constitutional Chamber,
Supreme Tribunal of Justice of Venezuela. There was an interesting discussion about the role of the
referendum in the convocation (and the approval of the work) of a future constituent assembly in one of
the sessions of the entity that drafted the Constitution of 1999. See Asamblea Nacional Constituyente,
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during a declared state of emergency, and has gone beyond the separation
of powers established through the Constitution of 1999.37
In the very speech where the convocation of the 2017 assembly was
announced, President Nicolás Maduro made clear he was convening a
sovereign body. “In the use of my presidential attributions,” he expressed,
“I convene the original constituent power . . . to achieve the peace that the
Republic needs, to defeat the fascist attempts at a coup, and so that the
people with its sovereignty imposes peace, harmony, and true national
dialogue.”38 “I am convening,” he added, “the totality of the motherland’s
power, above the Constituent Assembly there is no possible power!”39
During Maduro’s speech, there were mentions of the need of strengthening
the Constitution of 1999, of transforming the state and particularly the
National Assembly, and of constitutionalising several social policies. The
emphasis, however, was on the sovereign character of a constituent
assembly and on its independence from and superiority over the
established institutions of government.40 In a set of rules adopted by the
assembly which regulate its relationship with the constituted powers,41 the
entity also described itself as a “sovereign power” (postestad soberana)
that could “issue decrees determining the competences, functioning, and
organisation of the organs of Public Power.”42 That jurisdiction, the
document explained, came from a “mandate of the sovereign people.”43
Despite the various references to a popular mandate or to popular
sovereignty during this process, the National Constituent Assembly was
conceived by the President of the Republic, and later by itself, as a
sovereign entity. That is to say, as an entity that could determine its own
competencies and, by implication, the competencies of any other public
authority. Indeed, shortly after it came into session, the assembly adopted a
series of “Constituent Acts” where it engaged in actions of a legislative,44
Gaceta Constituyente: Noviembre-Enero, Sesión Núm. 40 (Caracas: Imprenta del Congreso de la
República, 1999) vol 3.
37
For a discussion of the process that led to the convocation of the assembly, see Ana Graciela
Barrios Benatuil et al., Constituyentes Venezolanas de 1999 y 2017: Contextos y Participación, 8
REVISTA DIREITO E PRÁXIS 3144, 3147–49 (2017).
38
JOEL COLÓN-RÍOS, CONSTITUENT POWER AND THE LAW 257 (2020) (alteration in original).
39
Id.
40
Id. The President also referred to Article 349 of the constitution, which maintains that “[t]he
existing constituted powers shall not be permitted to obstruct the Constituent Assembly in any way.”
CONSTITUCIÓN DE LA REPÚBLICA BOLIVARIANA DE VENEZUELA art. 349.
41
“Normas para garantizar el pleno funcionamiento institucional de la Asamblea Nacional
Constituyente en armonía con los Poderes Públicos constituidos.” GACETA OFICIAL no. 6323 (Aug. 8,
2017).
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
GACETA OFICIAL no. 41.274 (Nov. 8, 2017) (enacting the Constitutional Law against Hate and
For the Peaceful Coexistence and Tolerance).
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executive, and quasi-judicial nature. At the time of writing, there are no
clear indications of when the assembly will produce a draft constitution (if
indeed a constitution is to be produced). From a theoretical point of view,
there can be no objection to the powers claimed by this entity unless
constituent authority and sovereignty are distinguished. In fact, the
conflation of these two concepts is what allowed President Maduro to
convene an entity with unlimited jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding the many cases of sovereign constitution-making
assemblies in Latin America, one can see examples in other regions and
epochs.47 For instance, during the 19th century, some constitutional
conventions in U.S. states assumed a similar power. As noted by Roger
Sherman Hoar in his study of constitutional conventions, many of these
entities “have claimed the right to exercise powers far beyond the mere
framing of a constitutions or constitutional amendments.”48
This, Hoar showed, was not only the case of conventions operating
during the Revolutionary War and therefore governed by “the law of
extreme necessity,”49 but even of those called according to the provisions
of a constitution. For example, George M. Dallas maintained that once a
constitutional convention assembled in Pennsylvania, “it will possess . . .
every attribute of absolute sovereignty [within the state legal order] . . . . It
might restore the institution of slavery among us; it might make our penal
code as bloody as that of Draco; it might withdraw the charters of the cities
. . . .”50 Similarly, in the Illinois Convention of 1847, one of the delegates
maintained: “We are . . . the sovereignty of the State. We are what the
people of the State would be, if they were congregated here in one mass
meeting. We are what Louis XIV said he was, ‘We are the State.’”51 The
practical implications of this approach were clearly exemplified by the
Missouri Convention of 1865.52 Convened outside of the amendment rule
of the Missouri Constitution of 1820 and having been authorised to amend
the constitution (among other things, with the purpose of abolishing
slavery), this convention issued decrees vacating several judicial and

45

GACETA OFICIAL no. 41.265 (Oct. 26, 2017) (convening early municipal elections).
GACETA OFICIAL no. 41.272 (Nov. 6, 2017) (removing parliamentary immunity and authorising
a judicial process against the Vice President of the National Assembly).
47
See Andrew Arato, Post-Sovereign Constitution-Making in Hungary: After Success, Partial
Failure, and Now What?, 26 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 19, 19–20 (2010) (providing examples of
constitution-making efforts in several different countries).
48
ROGER SHERMAN HOAR, CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THEIR NATURE, POWERS, AND
LIMITATIONS 128 (1917).
49
Id. at 129.
50
Id. at 131–32.
51
Id. at 132.
52
JOHN ALEXANDER JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS; THEIR
HISTORY, POWERS, AND MODES OF PROCEEDING 322 (4th ed. 1887).
46
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53

executive offices. An earlier convention in that state had also removed
executive and judicial officials and repealed a number of ordinary laws.54
Some U.S. state courts also embraced that understanding of the power
of a constitutional convention. For example, in a 1907 case, the Supreme
Court of Oklahoma refused to invalidate the decision of a convention
issuing an ordinance dividing a county, an act that was argued to fall
outside of the scope of the authority granted in the entity’s enabling law.55
For the court, the idea that judges have the power to “enjoin or restrain the
convention, its officers or delegates, from exercising the rights, powers,
and duties confided to them must . . . be denied. Nor have the courts the
power or jurisdiction to enjoin or restrain the submission of the
Constitution or any proposition contained therein to a vote of the people.”56
The convention, the court added, “is a legislative body of the highest order,
and it cannot be interfered with by injunction in the exercise of its
powers.”57 In his dissent, Justice Irwin noted that the law has never vested
“arbitrary power in any body without surrounding and safeguarding it by
limitations and checks,” and that according to the decision of the court, the
convention was seen as an “unlimited, unqualified, and unquestionable
power—a creature greater than its creator, a stream higher than its source,
and a power which recognizes no rights and no authority save and except
its own sovereign will . . . .”58
Consistent with Justice Irwin’s dissent and anticipating the type of
argument that will be presented in Part III of this paper, Allen Caperton
Braxton wrote about the “mistaken and dangerous doctrine of the absolute
sovereignty and omnipotence of Constitutional Conventions . . . .”59 “[A]
Constitutional Convention,” he maintained, “is not the People, with
sovereign and unlimited powers, but a mere Committee of the People, with
only such limited powers as the People may expressly bestow upon them,
the granting of which powers will be strictly construed against the
Convention.”60 The Supreme Court of Alabama expressly adopted that
53

HOAR, supra note 48, at 138; JAMESON, supra note 52, at 322–23; MO. CONST. of 1820, art.

XII.
54

HOAR, supra note 48, at 138–39. Hoar also reports that the South Carolina Convention of 1895
established a new county, the Mississippi Convention of 1890 enacted an electoral law, and the Illinois
Convention of 1862 divided the State into congressional districts (a function assigned to state
legislatures by the U.S. Constitution). For a discussion, see id. at 140, 147.
55
Frantz v. Autry, 91 P. 193, 228 (Okla. 1907).
56
Id. at 207.
57
Id. at 209.
58
Id. at 232.
59
A. Caperton Braxton, Powers of Conventions, 7 VA. L. REG. 79, 79 (1901).
60
Id. at 96. Consistent with that view, partisans of what Arthur N. Holcombe called the
“coordinate authority of convention and legislature” theory argued that the scope of the powers of a
convention are to be found in the terms of the popular vote that authorized it. ARTHUR N. HOLCOMBE,
STATE GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 127 (1916).
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view in a 1905 case, stating that “in voting for the holding of a convention,
[the people] not only limited the powers of the convention to the
amendment and revision of the constitution of 1875, but required that its
action be submitted back to them.”61 Similarly, when declaring void an
ordinance issued by the South Carolina Convention of 1832 (convened
under Article 11 of the Constitution of 1790), the state Court of Appeals
maintained to have “no authority to judge of, revise or control any act of
the people; but when any thing is presented to us as the act of the people,
we must of necessity judge and determine whether it be indeed their act.”62
The members of the convention, the court maintained, were “not the
people for any other purpose than that for which the people elected and
delegated them.”63
III. CONSTITUENT MANDATES AND THEIR ENFORCEMENT
I have established a distinction between sovereignty and constituent
authority and provided some examples of constitution-making bodies
which have assumed, or have been attributed with, the former. In practice,
this means that they went beyond the creation of new constitutions and
acted beyond the established separation of powers. If one accepts the
distinction between sovereignty and constituent authority, it follows that
those assemblies acted ultra-vires. They acted as sovereign while being on
a commission, while being tasked only to draft a constitution. This is true
regardless of whether the relevant constitution-making body was legally or
illegally convened.64 There is no reason why the violation of a
constitution’s amendment rule should necessarily be taken to mean that the
entity drafting a new fundamental law acts in its own right as opposed as in
the exercise of a commission. The fact that even illegally convened
constituent assemblies are usually authorised by referendum reflects the
notion that they exist in virtue of a mandate. A constituent mandate of that
kind comes accompanied by two limits: The assembly has to actually draft
a constitution (i.e. that is, something that counts as a constitution in the
society at issue) and respect the identity of the constituent subject (i.e. it
cannot transform itself into a sovereign entity).
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Ex parte Birmingham, 145 Ala. 514, 529 (1905).
State v. Hunt, 20 S.C.L. 1, 270 (1834). For a discussion, see C.A.D., The Jurisdiction of a
Court of Equity over Constitutional Conventions, 6 MICH. L. REV. 70 (1906).
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Hunt, 20 S.C.L. at 270.
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Kay, supra note 4, at 757. Constitutions that provide for the convocation of a constituent
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cases of ex ante constituent authority. However, as Kay has maintained, the attitudes of a society
towards a constitution-maker may change over time, and those changes may retroactively deprive them
of constituent authority.
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As for the first limit, the task of drafting ‘a constitution’ in a
contemporary society would normally involve the creation of a document
that establishes a democratic form of government, that separates powers,
and that recognises rights.65 But the meaning of “constitution” should not
be derived from a philosophical or theoretical analysis to be applied by a
court.66 In an ideal scenario, it would be confirmed by the citizens
themselves through their vote in a ratificatory referendum. The second
limit is about respecting the identity of the constituent subject; about
preventing the assembly from becoming a sovereign. This involves, on the
one hand, a prohibition of going beyond any conditions established in the
relevant mandate (e.g. the adoption of particular constitutional content)
and, on the other, a prohibition against the exercise of the ordinary powers
of government. The respect of those limits may, in turn, determine whether
the relevant entity is recognized as a legitimate source of constitutional
law, as a true constituent authority at a particular moment in time.
As noted earlier, these limits would normally arise from a referendum.
The importance attributed to referendums in this paper should not be taken
as an implicit dismissal of the academic critiques of that institution.67 As
Kay notes, the association of constituent authority with referendums is
highly problematic. In particular, referendum results can be controlled in
different ways by its organizers.68 To see referendums as “the people in
action” also rests on the fiction that “the people” has a unified voice.69
Notwithstanding these problems, in the context of the argument to be
presented below, the referendum forms part of a useful fiction, that is, one
that serves to combat the (also fictional) idea that the decisions of a
constitution-making body are the decisions of the people.
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This is the idea expressed by the famous Article 16 of the French Declaration of the Rights of
Man and the Citizen: “Any society in which no provision is made for guaranteeing rights or for the
separation of powers, has no Constitution.” Déclaration des Droits de I’Homme et du Citoyen de 1789,
Aug. 26, 1789 (Fr.), https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/sites/default/files/as/root/bank_mm/
anglais/cst2.pdf. As the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal has noted, not any document can count as a
constitution. Not only must the constitution have been “the work of the Constituent Power . . . [but] as
expressed in Article 16 of the French Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, must be
minimally recognised and guarantee the essential rights of man, as well as the separation of powers,
which are the primary values of a Constitutional State.” Judgment No. 014-2003-AI/TC (Tribunal
Constitucional del Perú).
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For that kind of approach, see Carlos Bernal Pulido, Prescindamos del Poder Constituyente en
la Creación Constitucional. Los Límites Conceptuales del Poder para Reemplazar o Reformar una
Constitución, 22 ANUARIO IBEROAMERICANO JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL 59, 74 (2018).
67
For contemporary analyses of the problems and democratic potential of referenda, see ZORAN
OKLOPCIC, BEYOND THE PEOPLE: SOCIAL IMAGINARY AND CONSTITUENT IMAGINATION 46–49 (2018);
STEPHEN TIERNEY, CONSTITUTIONAL REFERENDUMS: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF REPUBLICAN
DELIBERATION 299–303 (2012).
68
Kay, supra note 4, at 747.
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Before that argument can be fully defended, one must first conclude
that a legally regulated voting process can be understood as an expression
of sovereign power as opposed to a mere electoral act. In order to do so, a
distinction needs to be made between constitutional and constituent
referendums. There are many constitutions with amendment rules that
require popular ratification before a proposal to alter the constitutional text
can become law. Some of those constitutions also require that the
modification of fundamental principles takes place through a constituent
assembly. Consider, for example, Article 411 of the Constitution of
Bolivia. That provision authorises the partial reform of the constitution
through a process that may be triggered by popular initiative or by a
majority of the members of the legislative assembly, and that ends in
popular approval or rejection in a referendum. The total reform of the
constitution, defined as “that which affects its fundamental premises,
rights, duties, and guarantees, or the supremacy and reform of the
Constitution,” according to the same article, must take place through a
constituent assembly (called by a referendum and whose proposed changes
are also subject to popular ratification).70
Under those constitutional provisions, it seems clear that the partial
reform process cannot be used to alter the material constitution, that is, the
most fundamental norms contained in it.71 The constitution’s material
content can only be revised through the procedure of total reform. The first
of these processes would involve the exercise of constituted power; the
second would require the exercise of constituent authority. Both, however,
involve the participation of the electorate through a referendum and,
potentially, through popular initiative.72 Is it possible to say that in the first
case, the electorate acts as a mere state organ and that, in the second, the
same electorate acts as the sovereign? In a certain way, the participation of
the electorate in constitutional reform can only be understood as an act of
constituted power.73 The reason is simple: in the context of those
procedures, the electorate acts within the limits posed by the constitution
itself; it does not act as an omnipotent political force, but as a
non-sovereign organ of the state.74 Reaching the same conclusion, Pedro de
70
The Assembly is described by Article 411 as “original plenipotentiary Constituent Assembly.”
That is to say, the constitution itself seems to problematically assume that once convened, the
Assembly becomes sovereignty. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 7, 2009,
art. 411 (Bol.).
71
Such as the norms establishing the basic structure of government and regulating the relations
between the state and the citizens, i.e. what Schmitt called the “constitution in the positive sense.”
SCHMITT, CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY, supra note 18, at 75.
72
In the case of the Bolivian Constitution of 2009, the Constituent Assembly can be convened by
popular initiative. CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DEL ESTADO [CONSTITUTION] Feb. 7, 2009, art. 411 (Bol.).
73
PEDRO DE VEGA, LA REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL Y LA PROBLEMÁTICA DEL PODER
CONSTITUYENTE 111 (1985).
74
Id.
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Vega has argued that the referendum should be understood in its classical
sense, that is, as a mechanism of control.75 The referendum is “an
instrument of ratification of the act of a representative (an assembly) by the
represented (the people).”76
To the extent that the referendum is about controlling the amending
authority, it cannot be understood as a means “through which the power of
constitutional reform -which is always a constituted power- becomes a
sovereign constituent power.”77 This kind of view was also expressed in a
series of judgments of the Colombian Constitutional Court. The Colombian
court has stated that, in a “participatory democracy, based on the principle
of popular sovereignty,” the people are not limited to act through their
representatives.78 Rather, they are also able to engage in direct political
acts.79 A democracy, the court has maintained, cannot be participatory
unless the people can sometimes act as the bearer of the power of
constitutional reform.80 In Colombia, this is facilitated through what the
court identified as the “constitutional referendum,” regulated in Articles
377 and 378 of the Constitution of 1991.81 Under Article 377,
constitutional changes that relate to the rights recognised in Chapter 1,
Title II, to the procedures of popular participation or to Congress itself,
must be submitted to the electorate if requested by five percent of the
citizens who make up the electoral rolls.82 But the court made sure to point
out that the inclusion of the referendum as part of the mechanism of
constitutional reform is not equivalent to the establishment of a “pure
direct democracy, not subject to judicial control.”83
“The power of constitutional reform, even when it includes a
referendum,” the court stated, “is not the deed of neither the originary
constituent power nor of the sovereign people, but an expression of a juridical
competency organised by the Constitution itself.”84 For that reason, the court
maintained, such a power is always limited by the impossibility of replacing
the constitution. Otherwise the power of constitutional reform would become
the originary constituent power.85 The type of electoral acts examined in
75
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Id. at 113.
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Id. at 114.
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Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 9, 2003, Sentencia C-551/03, Gaceta
de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. 2, p. 42) (Colom.).
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Id.
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Id.
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CONSTITUCIÓN POLÍTICA DE COLUMBIA [C.P.] art. 377.
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Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 9, 2003, Sentencia C-551/03, Gaceta
de la Corte Constitucional [G.C.C.] (vol. 2, p. 44) (Colom.).
84
Id. at 40.
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Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], julio 9, 2003, Sentencia C-551/03,
Magistrado Ponente: Eduardo Montealegre Lynett (¶ 40) (Colom.). See also Corte Constitucional
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those judgments can be identified, as suggested by the court itself, as
constitutional referendums. That is, referendums through which a proposed
constitutional change is approved as part of a procedure established by the
constitutional amendment rule. But not all referendums are like that.
Indeed, the Colombian Constitutional Court has distinguished between
situations “where the citizenry acts as a constituted organ, and accordingly,
as a limited one,” and situations where the people, acting “outside of any
normative channel, decide[] to alter the constitution or give itself a new
one.”86 The latter was the case when the Colombian Constitution of 1991
was adopted by an assembly convened through a referendum in violation
of the amendment rule of the Constitution of 1886.87 In that type of
scenario, the court maintained, the people acts as the originary constituent
power.88
Both an authorising and ratificatory referendum, as long as they
involve the alteration of the material constitution, should be understood as
constituent referendums. That is, as instances in which the sovereign
exercises its constituent power directly, that is, in the absence of a
commission.89 This is true regardless of the referendum’s legal status. That
an authorising referendum takes place according to law cannot be enough
to deprive it from its constituent nature and cannot lead us to ignore the
fact that it may result in the replacement of an entire constitution.90 During
the 1999 constitution-making process in Venezuela, the Supreme Court of
Justice (as that of Colombia in 1991) reached a similar conclusion about
the nature of a referendum that took place in violation of the amendment
rule of the Constitution of 1961. In the end, however, the Venezuelan
courts only recognized the binding character of the mandate contained in it
in a partial way, attributing the assembly with the power to determine the
[C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 26, 2010, Sentencia C-141/10, Magistrado Sustanciador:
Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto (¶ 1.3) (Colom.); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court],
julio 18, 2016, Sentencia C-379/16, Magistrado Ponente: Luis Ernesto Vargas Silva (¶ 4.4) (Colom.)
(discussing ways in which the people take part in legislative procedure).
86
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 26, 2010, Sentencia C-141/10,
Magistrado Sustanciador: Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto (Colom.).
87
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], febrero 26, 2010, Sentencia C-141/10,
Magistrado Sustanciador: Humberto Antonio Sierra Porto (¶ 4.2.6) (Colom.). The same point was made
in Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], marzo 14, 2007, Sentencia C-180/07, Magistrado
Ponente: Dr. Rodrigo Escobar Gil (¶ 2.2.2.2.1) (Colom.).
88
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], marzo 14, 2007, Sentencia C-180/07,
Magistrado Ponente: Dr. Rodrigo Escobar Gil (¶ 2.2.2.2.1) (Colom.).
89
As Massimo Luciani has noted, “[i]t has never been claimed that the holder of sovereignty can
only act in a sovereign capacity.” Massimo Luciani, El Referéndum: Cuestiones Teóricas y de la
Experiencia Italiana, 37 REVISTA CATALANA DE DRET PÚBLIC 1, 11 (2008).
90
As Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde has stated, “[A]nytime the people takes an active role as an
organized entity the unorganised people of the pouvoir constituant is also involved and present in some
way.” ERNST-WOLFGANG BÖCKENFÖRDE, CONSTITUTIONAL AND POLITICAL THEORY: SELECTED
WRITINGS 179 (Mirjam Künkler & Tine Stein eds., 2017).
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scope of its own jurisdiction. But it does not have to be like this, not even
in the context of constituent assemblies convened outside of a
constitution’s rules of change.
There is a long tradition of thought that holds that although a
representative acts on a free mandate and therefore is not bound by citizen
instructions, she acts under an imperative mandate with respect to the
constitution itself.92 That is to say, that there are things representatives can
or cannot do because they had been authorised or deauthorised to do them
by the sovereign who brought the constitution into existence. In a similar
manner, the conditions expressed or implied in a constituent referendum
can also be understood as establishing a binding mandate on the resulting
constitution-making body. In such cases, the electorate acts as if it was the
people.93 Whenever there is a constituent mandate, a ratificatory
referendum would not only serve the purpose of approving or rejecting the
proposed constitution, but of confirming that the relevant conditions have
been respected. Those conditions may include the creation of determinate
constitutional content or the production of a new constitutional text within
a certain period. They may also require the submission of the draft
constitution to popular ratification.
A question that inevitably arises here is whether the conditions that
arise from a constituent mandate should be judicially enforced. For
example, could a court intervene where a lawfully or unlawfully convened
constitution-making body attempts to go beyond the conditions that arise
from a constituent referendum? At least in a system where courts are
already attributed with the power of enforcing constitutional law, that is, of
enforcing what is ultimately understood as the ‘will of the people,’ I think
the answer is yes. In so doing, the court could be understood not as
interfering with the ultimate constitution-making power of the people but
as protecting it; making sure its mandate has been respected by the entity
exercising constituent authority.94 Accordingly, the court would not be
91

See, e.g., Judgment No. 1110 (n. 101) 39–41 and the rest of the cases collected in BASES
JURISPRUDENCIALES DE LA SUPRACONSTITUCIONALIDAD (Caracas: Supreme Tribunal of Justice,
2002).
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See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (“It is not otherwise to be supposed,
that the Constitution could intend the representatives of the people to substitute their WILL to that of
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This is, of course, not a novel idea—it was even present in Article 117 of the French
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topics it was allowed to deliberate on. Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen, June 24, 1793
(Fr.), https://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/les-constitutions-dans-l-histoire/constitution-du-24-juin1793.
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Even in situations where the established constitution seeks to limit the powers of a constituent
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negating a constitution-making body’s jurisdiction to alter the constitution
in fundamental ways but, for example, ensuring that it abides by any
substantive limits contained in the referendum question. In the end, this
kind of review is about an institution that, given its role during ordinary
times, becomes the only organ able to legitimately challenge abuses of
power during a constitution-making episode. Precisely for that reason, this
review power should only be exercised in rare situations, and with
attention to the entire nature of the constitution-making process at issue.
For example, there could be instances where the attempt to exercise the
ordinary powers of government may be part of an effort to comply with the
mandate of creating a new constitution, as when a legislature actively
interferes with the activities of a constituent assembly. In that type of case,
it could be argued that the constituent assembly’s commission comes
accompanied by an implicit authorisation to engage in any juridical acts
that “are necessary and proper for the execution of powers expressly
granted,” as John Alexander Jameson maintained in his 1887 book.95 There
may also be cases were the court disagrees with the assembly’s
interpretation of the content of an explicit limitation arising from the
constituent referendum. For instance, does a mandate to create a
constitution that establishes a bicameral legislature require that both
chambers have equal powers? In this kind of case, the exercise of judicial
authority should arguably be highly deferential as long as the disagreement
is a reasonable one. Moreover, in constitution-making processes where the
draft constitution is to be subject to final popular ratification, courts should
be especially careful: questions about whether the specific conditions set
by a constituent referendum have been respected may sometimes be better
left to the electorate.
FINAL THOUGHTS
In “Constituent Authority,” Kay examined two decisions of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that revolved around the nature and
powers of the Constitutional Convention of 1873, convened outside the
amendment rule of the Constitution of 1838.96 These decisions exemplify
what is at stake in any attempt to legally limit a constituent entity. “In a
paradoxical argument,” Kay writes, “the court acknowledged that the
convention procedure was a way of expressing the original will of the
(limits that a constitutional text imposes on a future constituent assembly) should not be judicially
enforceable if inconsistent with the commission arising from a referendum question.
95
JOHN ALEXANDER JAMESON, A TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 302 (4th ed.
1887). Jameson described situations where conventions failed to respect the separation of powers, as
“usurpations of authority” carried out by revolutionary force, though, adding that while illegal, they
could in some cases be morally or politically justified. Id. at 325.
96
Kay, supra note 4, at 729–30.
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sovereign people—something outside the positive law rules of the
constitution—but that procedure was cognizable as such only because it
was authorized by the positive law of the enabling legislation.”97 Despite
this undeniable ambiguity, these decisions have the merit of avoiding the
confusion between the entity tasked to adopt a constitution and the
sovereign people. In one of those judgments, the court was at pains to
distance itself from the comments of Judge Edwin H. Stowe at the trial
court, who pointed toward the “absolute power” of the convention in
respect to any limitations imposed by the authorising legislation.98 In the
context of the case, such absolute power would have even included the
ability of the convention to determine, contrary to the legislative act under
which it was called, that its draft constitution would not be submitted to a
popular vote.
The Supreme Court maintained that:
[i]f, by a mere determination of the people to call a
convention whether it be by a vote or otherwise, the entire
sovereignty of the people passes ipso facto into a body of
deputies or attorneys, so that these deputies can without
ratification, . . . impose at will a new government upon the
people[,] . . . no true liberty remains.99
Such a view would “declare the impotency of the people, and the
absolute potency of their agents.”100 To say that a constitutional convention
is legally bound by law, the court argued, is not to say that the legislature is
able to restrain the people. On the contrary, it is to recognise that the
people, through the actions of their representatives in the legislature, can
limit the power of their representatives in a constitutional convention.101
“The idea which lies at the root of the fallacy, that a convention cannot be
controlled by law[,]” maintained the court, “is[] that the convention and the
people are identical.”102 In the other case, which examined the legality of a
decision of the constitutional convention to pass an ordinance seeking to
regulate the election through which the constitution would be approved or
rejected, the court added that the members of a constitutional convention
“possess no inherent power.”103 If they have “greater powers than are
contained in [the law authorising their election],” the court rhetorically
97
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asked, “when, where and how did they obtain them?” The argument
presented in this paper is largely consistent with that reasoning, but with
one important qualification.
That is to say, the limits imposed by “law” must arise not from a mere
legislative act but be contained in a mandate arising from a constituent
referendum. They must be limits that can be reasonably understood as
arising from the sovereign people and not from the constituted authorities.
In that respect, Judge Stowe’s judgment at the trial court was not as
scandalous as may otherwise appear. For him, a constitutional convention
had “absolute power. . . [u]nless prohibited or restricted in the manner
specified by the people. . . .”105 “In saying this,” he clarified, “we are not to
be understood as saying that the convention is in any respect the supreme
power of the state. We take it to be simply the attorney for the people, with
plenary power to do what is required of it, but nothing beyond.”106 The
idea, it seems, is that an entity tasked to create a new constitution can be
subject to limits, but to limits imposed by the people directly, not by the
positive law emanating from the legislature. This is in no way a novel
notion, and it rests on a number of fictions that accompany modern
constitutionalism, in particular, that there is a ‘sovereign people’ that can
somehow act through a referendum. It is nonetheless a fiction that negates
an at least equally problematic notion: that being tasked to draft a
constitution necessarily involves an authorisation to act in a sovereign
capacity.
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